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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to apply a contextual probabilistic model
(in the spirit of Mackey, Gudder, Ballentine) to represent and to gener-
alize some results of quantum logic about possible macroscopic quantum-
like (QL) behaviour. The crucial point is that our model provides QL-
representation of macroscopic configurations in terms of complex proba-
bility amplitudes – wave functions of such configurations. Thus, instead
of the language of propositions which is common in quatum logic, we use
the language of wave functions which is common in the conventional pre-
sentation of QM. We propose a quantum-like representation algorithm,
QLRA, which maps probabilistic data of any origin in complex (or even
hyperbolic) Hilbert space. On the one hand, this paper clarifyes some
questions in foundations of QM, since some rather mystical quantum fea-
tures are illustrated on the basis of behavior of macroscopic systems. On
the other hand, the approach developed in this paper may be used e.g.
in biology, sociology, or psychology. Our example of QL-representation of
hidden macroscopic configurations can find natural applications in those
domains of science.
Keywords: contextual probabilistic model, quantum-like representa-
tion algorithm, macroscopic quantum-like systems
1 Introduction
One should sharply distinguish QM as a physical theory and the math-
ematical formalism of QM. In the same way as one should distinguish
classical Newtonian mechanics and its mathematical formalism. Nobody
is surprised that the differential and integral calculi which are basic in
Newtonian mechanics can be fruitfully applied in other domains of sci-
ence. Unfortunately, the situation with the mathematical formalism of
QM is essentially more complicated – some purely mathematical features
of QM are identified with features of quantum physical systems. Although
1
already Nils Bohr pointed out [1], see also [2], [3], to the possibility to ap-
ply the mathematical formalism of QM outside of physics, prejudice based
on the identification of mathematics and physics still survives (but cf. e.g.
Accardi, Aerts, Ballentine, De Muynck, Grib et al., Gudder, Gustafson,
Lande´, Mackey [4]–[19] and also [20]–[22]). One can point out just to a few
applications outside of physics. Here we discuss not reductionist models
in that the quantum description appears as a consequence of the evident
fact that any physical system, even living (for example, the brain, see e.g.
[23], [24]), is composed of quantum particles, but really the possibility
to use the mathematical formalism of QM without direct coupling with
quantum physics, see e.g. [5], [25], [26], [10]–[13].
We remark that importance of mentioned separation between quantum
physics and quantum mathematics has been already well recognized in
quantum logic, see e.g. Mackey [19] or Beltrametti and Cassinelli [27].
In particular, an exiting possibility to apply quantum mathematics to
macroscopic systems is not surprising for quantum logicians. However, one
could not see visible results of diffussion of this quantum logic knowledge
into real quantum physics. There are a few reasons for this, in particular,
psychological ones. It seems that the main problem is that the majority of
physicists think that QM is not about new logic, but new physics. Thus
the massage of Birkhof and von Neumann[28], as well as Bohr [1] who
discussed a possibility to reduce quantum particularities to elaboration of
new “quantum language”, was practically ignored in quantum physics.
We point out that quantum logic is closely interrelated with quan-
tum probability which is a caculus of complex probability amplitudes and
self-adjoint operators (in contrast to classical Kolmogorovian probability
theory which is a calculus of measures and measurable functions, random
variables). Roughly speaking quantum logic emphasizes the observational
part quantum formalism, the calculus of propositions [27] representing re-
sults of quantum observations. The complex probability amplitude (the
wave function) does not belong to the main field of interest of quantum
logicians.1 On the other hand, the wave function is the basic object of
practical quantum physics [29], [30].
Recently I developed so called contextual probability theory [31] which
was inspired essentially by quantum logic and quantum probability, espe-
cially Mackey’s approach [19].2 The main distinguishing feature of the
theory of contextual probabilities is a possibility to derive the complex
probability amplitude, the wave function, from probabilistic data. Such
an algorithm for mapping of probabilistic data into the complex probabil-
1Personally I am not quantum logician. Thus my interpretation may be wrong from the
internal viewpoint of quantum logic. But I think that it has right as rather general external
opinion.
2I was lucky to meet George Mackey at the Congress of Quantum Structures Associa-
tion in Castiglioncello, Italy, 1992. Our conversations on the probabilistic structure of QM
were the starting point of my further studies on contextual probability. I also was lucky to
speak shortly with Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov (when he submited my paper to Doklady
Akademii Nauk USSR). I was surprised that personally he was not satisfied by his axiomatics
of probability theory [32]. Later (after his death) his former students Albert Shiryaev and
Alexander Bulinskii explained me that contextuality of probabilities and the impossiblity to
play the whole game with a single Kolmogorov space was evident for Kolmogorov [33].
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ity amplitude was proposed in [31], quantum-like representation algorithm
– QLRA. This algorithm also generates representation of observables (in
fact, to fixed “reference observables”) by self-adjoint operators. Thus by
contextual probability theory the mathematical quantum structure is not
fundamental. It appears as a special representation of probabilistic data.
The main distinguishing feature of the QL-representation is ignorance by
details about system’s behaviour which are not approachable by an ex-
ternal observer. This is a consistent way to proceed within incomplete
description of system’s behavior.3
The aim of this paper is to use our contextual probabilistic model,
the Va¨xjo¨ model, to represent and to generalize some results of quantum
logic on macroscopic quantum-like (QL) behaviour in terms of complex
probability amplitudes. On the one hand, it may be intersting for physi-
cists, since some rather mystical quantum features will be illustrated on
the basis of behavior of macroscopic systems. On the other hand, the
approach developed in this paper may be used e.g. in biology, sociology,
or psychology. Our example of QL-representation of hidden macroscopic
configurations can find natural applications in these domains of science.
The basic example which we would like to generalize in the contextual
probabilistic framework is well known in quantum logic. This is “firefly in
the box”. It was proposed by Foulis who wanted to show that a macro-
scopic system, firefly, can exhbit a QL-behavior which can be naturally
represented in terms of quantum logics. First time this example was pub-
lished in Cohen’s book [34], a detalied presentation can be found in Foulis’
paper [35], see also Svozil [36]. Later “firefly in the box” was generalized
to a so called generalized urn’s model, by Wright [37] (psychologist).
From the viewpoint of quantum logic such examples illustrate the fol-
lowing problem. For a given quantum logic one wants to find a Boolean
algebra such that by ignoring some elements of this algebra one obtains the
original quantum logic. I would formulate this problem in the following
way: “To quantum (and more general QL) structures through ignorance
of some information about underlying classical Boolean algebras.” We
shall use two lessons of previous studies in quantum logic: a) essentially
quantum structures (lattices of quantum projectors) can be obtained from
purely classical Boolean models; b) not all quantum structures have un-
derlying classical Boolean models.
Similar lessons we have from studies on contextual probability:
a). The QLRA can be applied to classical probabilistic data (which
can be described by the Kolmogorov model). The result will be nontrivial:
Born’s rule, interference of probabilities, representation of Kolmogorovian
random variables by self-adjoint operators. Thus all basic quantum struc-
tures are present in the classical probabilistic models, but in a latent form.
b). The quantum probabilistic structure could not be completely re-
produced on the basis of a single Kolmogorov probability space (by using
Gudder’s terminology one must consider a probability manifold with the
atlas consisting of a few Kolmogorovian charts).
3Consistency is an extremely important feature of quantum and QL representations of
probabilistic data. Of course, one may try cut off data ocationaly, but such a data-processing
would (soon or later) induce chaos.
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Regarding b) we point out to one very important difference between
quantum logic and contextual probability theory. According to the latter
even in the two dimensional case an undelying classical model does not
exist. By applying QLRA to probabilistic data obtained on the basis of
a single Kolmogorov probability space we are not able to get all pure
quantum states and all pairs of noncommutative observables. To show
this, we use an analogue of Bell’s inequality for transition probabilities,
see [38] and appendix.
In general, our contextual model is based on the frequency definition
of probability which was formalized by R. von Mises [39] (this formaliza-
tion was simplified and justified in [40]). By using frequency probabilities
we can reproduce completely the pobabilistic structure of QM. However,
the contextual statistical model is not reduced to the quantum proba-
bilistic model. Besides ordinary trigonometric cos-interference it predicts
hypebolic cosh-interference. Corresponding contexts are repsented not
by complex, but hyperbolic probability amplitude, i.e., in an analogue of
Hilbert space, but over the algebra of hypebolic numbers, z = x+jy, j2 =
+1, x, y ∈ R, see [31].
We can mention some consequences of our QL-representation of macroscoipic
configurations for foundations of quantum physics. All distinguishing fea-
tures of the quantum probabilistic behavior can be modeled by using
macroscopic systems. For such macroscopic models the QL-description
is not complete. Thus hidden variables exist, but they could not be ob-
served on the basis of available observables. Those observables which we
(external observers) could use are too fuzzy, cf. [41]. Nevertheless, a kind
of Einstein’s demon can observe behavior of hidden variables.4 Since our
examples are macroscopic, such Einstein’s demon can be a macroscopic
observer. Classical probability describes models in that measurements of
complementary observables are not mutually disturbing. As we remarked,
such models do not cover completely QM.5 On the other hand, by using
models with mutual distrbance and the frequency approach to probability
we can reconstruct QM in the realistic framework. We also discuss “fly-
realization” of the EPR-Bohm experiment. Since flyes are macroscopic
systems, realism could not be questioned. Possible explanations of vio-
lation of Bell’s inequality are nonlocality [42], unfair sampling [43], [44],
[45], ensemble nonreproducibility [46], [40], [47], [48]. For macroscopic
systems the latter two possibilities are essentially more natural than the
first one.
Of course, we understand well that our fly-methaphor can not be used
for derivation of crucial consequences about microscopic quantum systems,
such as photons and electrons. It might be that similarities in mathemat-
ical description are just occational. Nevertheless, these similarities are
really astonishing.
4This demon is similar to Maxwell’s demon who might (in principle) violate the principles of
thermodynamics. Einstein’s demon might violate principles of the Copenhagen interpretation
of QM, in particular, the principle of complementarity.
5To show this, we use an analogue of Bell’s inequality which we obtained for transition
probabilities, see appendix.
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Figure 1: Internal description.
Cα1
Cα2
b
Figure 2: The a-observable.
2 Firefly in the box
We recall the well known example [35] of QL-behavior. We modify its
presentation by emphasizing its probabilistic structure. Let us consider
a box which is divided into four sub-boxes. These small boxes which are
denoted by ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 provides internal description. These elements
are avalaible for Einstein’s demon, but they are not avalaible for some
external observable.
We consider the Kolmogorov probability space: Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4},
the algebra of all finite subsets F of Ω and a probability measure deter-
mined by probabilities P(ωj) = pj , where 0 < pj < 1, p1 + ...+ p4 = 1.
We now consider two different disjoint partitions of the set Ω :
Cα1 = {ω1, ω2}, Cα2 = {ω3, ω4},
Cβ1 = {ω1, ω4}, Cβ2 = {ω2, ω3}.
We can obtain such partitions by dividing the box: a) into two equal parts
by the vertical line: the left-hand part gives Cα1 and the right-hand part
Cα2 ; b) into two equal parts by the horizontal line: the top part gives Cβ1
and the bottom part Cβ2 .
We introduce two random variables corresponding to these partitions:
ξa(ω) = αi, if ω ∈ Cαi and ξb(ω) = βi ∈ if ω ∈ Cβi . Here αi and βi
are arbitrary labels. Suppose now that the external observer is able to
measure only these two variables, denote the corresponding observables by
the symbols a and b. We remark that there exist other random variables,
they are avalaible for Einstein’s demon, but not for the external observer.6
Roughly speaking elements ωj are not visible for the latter observer. They
are “hidden variables.”
Such a probabilistic model can be illustrated by the following example
[35]. Let us consider a firefly in the box. It has definite position in space.
The firefly position can be seen by Einstein’s demon living inside this box.
6For example, ξ(ω) = +1, ω = ω1, ω2, ω3, and ξ(ω) = −1, ω = ω4.
5
bCβ1
Cβ2
Figure 3: The b-observable
Now we consider an external observer who has only two possibilities
to observe the firefly in the box:
1) to open a small window at the point a which is located in such a
way (the bold dot in the middle of the bottom side of the box, Figure 2)
that it is possible to determine only either the firefly is in the section Cα1
or in the section Cα2 of the box;
2) to open a small window at the point b which is located in such a
way (the bold dot in the middle of the right-hand side of the box, Figure
3) that it is possible to determine only either the firefly is in the section
Cβ1 or in the section Cβ2 of the box.
In the first case such an external observer can determine in which
part, Cα1 or Cα2 , the firefly is located. In the second case he can only
determine in which part, Cβ1 or Cβ2 , the firefly is located. But he is not
able to look into both windows simultaneously. In such a situation the
observables a and b are the only source of information about the firefly
(“reference observables”). The Kolmogorov description is meaningless for
the external observer (although it is present in the latent form), but it is
very useful for Eistein’s demon.
Can one apply in such a situation the QL-description? Can we con-
struct the wave function of the firefly in the box? Can we represent
observables (in fact, classical random variables) a and b by self-adjoint
operators? The answers are to be positive.
3 Contextual probability
A general statistical model for observables based on the contextual view-
point to probability will be presented. It will be shown that classical as
well as quantum probabilistic models can be obtained as particular cases
of our general contextual model, the Va¨xjo¨ model, [31]. As was men-
tioned in introduction, I was inspired by Mackey’s program: To deduce
the probabilistic formalism of quantum mechanics starting with a system
of natural probabilistic axioms. We reduced essentially the number of
axioms (Mackey had 8 axioms and we have only two axioms). But the
main differernce between Mackey’s model and the Va¨xjo¨ model is that
Makey should postulate the complex Hilbert space structure, but in our
model it is derived from our two axioms. Moreover, representations of the
Va¨xjo¨ model are not reduced to the conventional, classical and quantum
ones. Our model also implies hyperbolic cosh-interference that induces
“hyperbolic quantum mechanics” [31].
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A physical, biological, social, mental, genetic, economic, or financial
context C is a complex of corresponding conditions. Contexts are funda-
mental elements of any contextual probabilistic model. Thus construction
of any model M should be started with fixing the collection of contexts of
this model. Denote the collection of contexts by the symbol C (so the fam-
ily of contexts C is determined by the model M under consideration). In
the mathematical formalism C is an abstract set (of “labels” of contexts).
We remark that in some models it is possible to construct a set-
theoretic representation of contexts – as some family of subsets of a set Ω.
For example, Ω can be the set of all possible parameters (e.g., physical, or
mental, or economic) of the model. However, in general we do not assume
the possibility to construct a set-theoretic representation of contexts.
Another fundamental element of any contextual probabilistic model
M is a set of observables O : each observable a ∈ O can be measured
under each complex of conditions C ∈ C. For an observable a ∈ O, we
denote the set of its possible values (“spectrum”) by the symbol Xa.
We do not assume that all these observables can be measured simul-
taneously. To simplify considerations, we shall consider only discrete ob-
servables and, moreover, all concrete investigations will be performed for
dichotomous observables.
Axiom 1: For any observable a ∈ O and its value α ∈ Xa, there are
defined contexts, say Cα, corresponding to α-selections: if we perform a
measurement of the observable a under the complex of physical conditions
Cα, then we obtain the value a = α with probability 1. We assume that the
set of contexts C contains Cα-selection contexts for all observables a ∈ O
and α ∈ Xa.
For example, let a be the observable corresponding to some question:
a = + (the answer “yes”) and a = − (the answer “no”). Then the C+-
selection context is the selection of those participants of the experiment
who answering “yes” to this question; in the same way we define the C−-
selection context. By Axiom 1 these contexts are well defined. We point
out that in principle a participant of this experiment might not want to
reply at all to this question or she might change her mind immediately
after her answer. By Axiom 1 such possibilities are excluded. By the
same axiom both C+ and C−-contexts belong to the system of contexts
under consideration.
Axiom 2: There are defined contextual (conditional) probabilities
paC(α) ≡ P(a = α|C) for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O .
Thus, for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O , there is defined
the probability to observe the fixed value a = α under the complex of
conditions C.
Especially important role will be played by “transition probabilities”
pa|b(α|β) ≡ P(a = α|Cβ), a, b ∈ O, α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb, where Cβ is the
[b = β]-selection context. By axiom 2 for any context C ∈ C, there is
defined the set of probabilities: {paC : a ∈ O}. We complete this prob-
abilistic data for the context C by transition probabilities. The corre-
sponding collection of data D(O, C) consists of contextual probabilities:
pa|b(α|β), pbC(β), pb|a(β|α), paC(α)..., where a, b, ... ∈ O. Finally, we denote
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the family of probabilistic data D(O, C) for all contexts C ∈ C by the
symbol D(O, C)(≡ ∪C∈CD(O, C)).
Definition 1. (Va¨xjo¨ Model) A contextual probabilistic model of real-
ity is a triple M = (C,O,D(O, C)), where C is a set of contexts and O is a
set of observables which satisfy to axioms 1,2, and D(O, C) is probabilistic
data about contexts C obtained with the aid of observables belonging O.
We call observables belonging the set O ≡ O(M) reference of observ-
ables. Inside of a model M observables belonging to the set O give the
only possible references about a context C ∈ C. In the definition of the
Va¨xjo¨ Model we speak about “reality.” In our approach it is reality of
contexts.
In what follows we shall consider Va¨xjo¨ models with two dichotomous
reference observables.
4 Frequency definition of probabilities
The definition of probability has not yet been specified. In this paper we
shall use the frequency definition of probability as the limit of frequencies
in a long series of trials, von Mises’ approach, [39], [40]. We are aware that
this approach was criticized a lot in mathematical literature. However, the
main critique was directed against von Mises’ definition of randomness.
If one is not interested in randomness, but only in frequencies of trials,
then the frequency approach is well established, see [40].
We consider a set of reference observables O = {a, b} consisting of
two observables a and b. We denotes the sets of values (“spectra”) of the
reference observables by symbols Xa and Xb, respectively.
Let C be some context. In a series of observations of b (which can be
infinite in a mathematical model) we obtain a sequence of values of b :
x ≡ x(b|C) = (x1, x2, ..., xN , ...), xj ∈ Xb. In a series of observations of a
we obtain a sequence of values of a : y ≡ y(a|C) = (y1, y2, ..., yN , ...), yj ∈
Xa. We suppose that the principle of the statistical stabilization for rel-
ative frequencies [39], [40] holds. This means that the frequency proba-
bilities are well defined: pbC(β) = limN→∞ νN (β;x), β ∈ Xb; paC(α) =
limN→∞ νN (α; y), α ∈ Xa. Here νN(β; x) and νN(α; y) are frequencies of
observations of values b = β and a = α, respectively (under the complex
of conditions C).
Remark. (On the notions of collective and S-sequence) R. von Mises
considered in his theory two principles: a) the principle of the statistical
stabilization for relative frequencies; b) the principle of randomness. A
sequence of observations for which both principle hold was called a collec-
tive, [39]. However, it seems that the validity of the principle of statistical
stabilization is often enough for applications. Here we shall use just the
convergence of frequencies to probabilities. An analog of von Mises’ the-
ory for sequences of observations which satisfy the principle of statistical
stabilization was developed in [40]; we call such sequences S-sequences.
Everywhere in this paper it will be assumed that sequences of obser-
vations are S-sequences, cf. [40] (so we are not interested in the validity
8
of the principle of randomness for sequences of observations, but only in
existence of the limits of relative frequencies).
Let Cα, α ∈ Xa, be contexts corresponding to α-filtrations, see Ax-
iom 1. By observation of b under the context Cα we obtain a sequence:
xα ≡ x(b|Cα) = (x1, x2, ..., xN , ...), xj ∈ Xb. It is also assumed that
for sequences of observations xα, α ∈ Xa, the principle of statistical sta-
bilization for relative frequencies holds true and the frequency probabil-
ities are well defined: pb|a(β|α) = limN→∞ νN(β;xα), β ∈ Xb. Here
νN (β;x
α), α ∈ Xa, are frequencies of observations of value b = β under
the complex of conditions Cα. We can repeat all previous considerations
by changing b|a-conditioning to a|b-conditioning. There can be defined
probabilities pa|b(α|β).
5 Quantum-like representation algorithm
– QLRA
In [31] we derived the following formula for interference of probabilities:
pbC(β) =
X
α
paC(α)p
b|a(β|α) + 2λ(β|α, C)
sY
α
paC(α)p
b|a(β|α), (1)
where the coefficient of interference
λ(β|a,C) = p
b
C(β)−
P
α
paC(α)p
b|a(β|α)
2
pQ
α
paC(α)p
b|a(β|α) . (2)
A similar representation we have for the a-probabilities. Such interfer-
ence formulas are valid for any collection of contextual probabilistic data
satisfying the conditions:
R1). Observables a and b are symmetrically conditioned7:
pb|a(β|α) = pa|b(α|β).
R2). Observables a and b are mutually nondegenerate8:
pa|b(α|β) > 0, pb|a(β|α) > 0.
R2a). Context C is nondegenerate with respect to both observables a
and b :
pbC(β) > 0, p
a
C(α) > 0.
Suppose that also the following conditions hold:
7This condition will induce symmetry of the scalar product
8This condition will induce noncommutativity of operators aˆ and bˆ representing these
observables.
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R3). Coefficients of interference are bounded by one9:
˛˛˛pbC(β)−Pα paC(α)pb|a(β|α)
2
pQ
α
paC(α)p
b|a(β|α)
˛˛˛
≤ 1,
˛˛˛paC(α)−Pβ pbC(β)pa|b(α|β)
2
qQ
α p
b
C(β)p
a|b(α|β)
˛˛˛
≤ 1,
A context C such that R3) holds is called trigonometric, because in
this case we have the conventional formula of trigonometric interference:
pbC(β) =
X
α
paC(α)p
b|a(β|α) + 2 cos θ(β|α, C)
sY
α
paC(α)p
b|a(β|α), (3)
where λ(β|a,C) = cos θ(β|a,C). Parameters θ(β|α,C) are said to be b|a-
relative phases with respect to the context C. We defined these phases
purely on the basis of probabilities. We have not started with any linear
space; in contrast we shall define geometry from probability.10
We denote the collection of all trigonometric contexts by the symbol
Ctr.
By using the elementary formula:
D = A+B + 2
√
AB cos θ = |
√
A+ eiθ
√
B|2,
for real numbers A,B > 0, θ ∈ [0, 2π], we can represent the probability
pbC(β) as the square of the complex amplitude (Born’s rule):
pbC(β) = |ψC(β)|2 . (4)
Here
ψ(β) ≡ ψC(β) =
q
paC(α1)p
b|a(β|α1)+eiθC (β)
q
paC(α2)p
b|a(β|α2), β ∈ Xb,
(5)
where θC(β) ≡ θ(β|α, C).
The formula (5) gives the quantum-like representation algorithm –
QLRA. For any trigonometric context C by starting with the probabilistic
data – pbC(β), p
a
C(α), p
b|a(β|α) – QLRA produces the complex amplitude
ψC . This algorithm can be used in any domain of science to create the
QL-representation of probabilistic data (for a special class of contexts).
We point out that QLRA contains the reference observables as param-
eters. Hence the complex amplitude give by (5) depends on a, b : ψC ≡
ψ
b|a
C .
We denote the space of functions: ϕ : Xb → C by the symbol Φ =
Φ(Xb,C). SinceX = {β1, β2}, the Φ is the two dimensional complex linear
space. By using QLRA we construct the map
Jb|a : Ctr → Φ(X,C) (6)
9This condition will induce representation of the context C in the complex Hilbert space.
Thus complex numbers appear due to this condition.
10We remark that conditions R1) and R3) are also nessesary.
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which maps contexts (complexes of, e.g., physical conditions) into complex
amplitudes. The representation (4) of probability is nothing other than
the famous Born rule. The complex amplitude ψC(x) can be called a
wave function of the complex of physical conditions (context) C or a
(pure) state. We set ebβ(·) = δ(β− ·) – Dirac delta-functions concentrated
in points β = β1, β2. The Born’s rule for complex amplitudes (4) can
be rewritten in the following form: pbC(β) = |〈ψC , ebβ〉|2, where the scalar
product in the space Φ(Xb, C) is defined by the standard formula: 〈φ, ψ〉 =P
β∈Xb
φ(β)ψ¯(β). The system of functions {ebβ}β∈Xb is an orthonormal
basis in the Hilbert space Hab = (Φ, 〈·, ·〉).
Let Xb ⊂ R. By using the Hilbert space representation of the Born’s
rule we obtain the Hilbert space representation of the expectation of the
observable b: E(b|C) =P
β∈Xb
β|ψC(β)|2 =
P
β∈Xb
β〈ψC , ebβ〉〈ψC , ebβ〉 =
〈bˆψC , ψC〉, where the (self-adjoint) operator bˆ : Hab → Hab is determined
by its eigenvectors: bˆebβ = βe
b
β, β ∈ Xb. This is the multiplication operator
in the space of complex functions Φ(Xb,C) : bˆψ(β) = βψ(β). It is natural
to represent the b-observable (in the Hilbert space model) by the operator
bˆ.
We would like to have Born’s rule not only for the b-variable, but also
for the a-variable: paC(α) = |〈ϕ, eaα〉|2 , α ∈ Xa.
How can we define the basis {eaα} corresponding to the a-observable?
Such a basis can be found starting with interference of probabilities. We
set uaj =
p
paC(αj), pij = p(βj |αi), uij =
√
pij , θj = θC(βj). We have:
ϕ = ua1e
a
α1
+ ua2e
a
α2
, (7)
where
eaα1 = (u11, u12), e
a
α2
= (eiθ1u21, e
iθ2u22) (8)
The condition R1) implies that the system {eaαi} is an orthonormal basis
iff the probabilistic phases satisfy the constraint:
θ2 − θ1 = π mod 2π,
but, as we have seen [31], we can always choose such phases (under the
condition R1).
In this case the a-observable is represented by the operator aˆ which
is diagonal with eigenvalues α1, α2 in the basis {eaαi}. The conditional
average of the observable a coincides with the quantum Hilbert space
average: E(a|C) =P
α∈Xa
αpaC(α) = 〈aˆψC , ψC〉.
If condition R3) is violated, then we obtain nonconventional QL-representations
of probabilistic data, for example, in the hyperbolic analogue of the com-
plex Hilbert space [31].
It is important to remark that map (6) is not one-to one!!! Different
contexts can be mapped into the same complex probability amplitude, we
can also say that the same wave function may represent a few different
contexts, cf. section 10.2.
Finally, we mention one recent result of Karl Svozil [49] which seems
to be coupled to the number of reference observables – two – producing
QL-representation in our approach.
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6 Flyes in a packet
We consider a metal box. At different points inside this box there is food
which is attractive for flyes. Its distribution is not uniformly weighted, in
some points there is more food than in others, there are domains without
food. An external observer (who is staying outside this box) has no idea
about the real distribution of food in the box, but a “Einstein demon”
living inside this box knows well this distribution. We put a population of
flyes, say Ω, inside this box. After while they will be distributed in space
inside the box by coupling to sites with food. Our Einstein’s demon can
find the probability distribution P(x, y, z) to observe a fly at the point
with coordinates (x, y, z). It is assumed to be stationary (at least for a
while). In principle, some flyes can move between attractive points, but
statistically the number of flyes at each site with food is stable.
As in the example “firefly in the box”, one can divide this box in two
ways: a) by the vertical wall – a, see Figure 2; b) by horizontal wall –
b, see Figure 3. Here a(ω) = α1 if Einstein’s demon finds a fly ω in the
left-hand part and a(ω) = α2 if he finds a fly ω in the right-hand part
(e.g. α = ±1).We define b in a similar way: b(ω) = β1 if Einstein’s demon
finds a fly ω in the top part and b(ω) = β2 if he finds a fly ω in the bottom
part (e.g. β = ±1). Einstein’s demon can consider populations of flyes:
Ωα = {ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = α}, Ωβ = {ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = β}.
By assuming that P(Ωα),P(Ωβ) > 0, he can define transition probabili-
ties:
pb|a(β|α) = P(Ωβ |Ωα) ≡ P(Ωβ ∩ Ωα)
P(Aα)
and in the same way probabilities pa|b(α|β).
Let C be some domain inside the box. We shall consider it as a
geometric-context. Einstein’s demon can be find (by using the Bayes’
formula) conditional probability distribution:
PC(U) =
P(ΩU ∩ ΩC)
P(ΩC)
, (9)
for any subset U of box. Here ΩC = {ω ∈ Ω : (xω, yω, zω) ∈ C} is the
populattion of flyes which are concentrated inside the configuration C.
The population ΩU is defined in the same way.
This probability distribution PC provides the probabilistic representa-
tion of the domain C. Einstein’s demon encoded geometry by probability.
Of course, probability provides only rough images of geometric structures,
since the map:
C → PC
is not one-to-one. Denote now by F some σ-algebra of subsets of the box
such that the probability P – flyes’ distribution – can be defined on it.
Denote also the set of all probability measures on the F by the symbol
P . Then we have the map:
J : F → P . (10)
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This is the classical probabilistic representation of geometry (of distribu-
tion of food). It is avalaible for any internal observer ( Einstein’s demon )
who lives inside this box. In this mapping a lot of geometric information
is neglected. However, the whole probabilistic information is taken into
account. This is the end of the classical story!
Remark 6. 1. (Food and flyes version of fields and particles) This
representation has one interesting feature. Geometry of food distribution
is represented by ensembles of flyes. We can make the following analogy:
electromagnetic field can be represented by photons. One can compare
the food distribution with a kind of a “food-field” and flyes with particles
representing this field. If we put another type of insects into the box, they
may be not interested in this sort of food. They would not reproduce the
distribution P(x, y, z). Thus we may speak about various food-fields which
are represented by corresponding types of insects-particles. In some sense
this picture reminds Bohmian mechanics [50].
Now we modify the previous framework. We have the same box with
the same ditribution of fly-attractive food. But flyes are put not directly
in the box, but in a plastic packet, say C. The geometric configuration is
unknown for us – external observers. Moreover, we are not able to find its
configuration directly (even by making a hole in the box), because packet’s
surface is covered by a “B2-bomber type” material. Thus we look inside
the box, but we see nothing.11 Nevertheless, we (external observers) would
like to get at least partial information about this packet configuration by
using flyes distribution. The problem is complified by the assumption that
any attempt to open the metal box will induce destruction of the packet
which in its turn induces redistribution of flyes in the space. Such a hard
problem...
We do the following. As in the firefly-example we introduce fuzzy
coordinates a and b. We measure them in the following way. We assume
that we can put very quickly either vertical or horyzontal wall into the
box. Such a moving wall divides (pactically instanteneously, at least in
comparation with fly’s velocity) the box into two sub-boxes, but at the
same time it destroys (of course) the plastic packet. It is assumed that
after this act we can open each sub-box and find numbers of flyes in each
part of the box.
At the moment, cf. section 8, we consider nondisturbing measure-
ments: walls do not change food distributions in corresponding parts of
the box (those walls are negligibly thin and destruction of the packet does
not change the distribution of food). However, opening of any box induces
a strong disturbing effect, flyes are essentially redistributed.
Thus first we do the a-measuring by using the vertical wall. It divides
the box into two parts, say Cα1 and Cα2 . In this way we get probabilities
paC(α) that a fly was located in the α-side of the box. Since the vertical
wall moves quicky relatively to fly’s velocity, the number of flyes which
were able to change the left-hand part of the box to the right-hand part
11The “Einstein demon” also gets a problem, but he can still investigate packet’s geometry
just by moving over its surface. Of course, if the packet is disconnected, so it has a few
components, a few “Einstein demons” should be employed.
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or vice versa is statistically negligible. In principle, we might try to use
the classical formula:
paC(α) = PC(Ωα) ≡ P(Ωα ∩ ΩC)
P(ΩC )
,
However, it is tottaly unuseful for us, because we do not know the config-
uration C and hence PC .
We point out that if we do not open sub-boxes Cα and if after while the
corresponding “Einstein demons” measure the b-coordinate of flyes in each
part Cα of the box they will obtain the original transition probabilities
pb|a(β|α), since flyes will again redistribute in the domain Cα according to
the food-field.12 However, the original distribution of flyes in the domain
C∩Cα has been lost for ever even for the “Einstein demons.” We (external
observers) are not able to find transition probabilities in this way, since
opening of a box produces redistribution of flyes in it.
We also remark that trivially a(ω) = α on the α-part of the box.
Remark 6.2. (Reaction of “food-field” to space reconfiguration) At
the moment we proceed under the assumption that the “food-field” is not
sensitive to the disturbing effect of the moving wall (separating the box
into two sub-boxes). Moreover, the “food-field” is not sensitive to changes
of the geometry of space (“boundary conditions”). In principle, we can
imagine the following situation, see section 7. The appearance of a sep-
arating wall does not induce a disturbing effect which could move food
in space. However, the wall by itself can have some physical properties
influencing the food distribution. For example, food is placed in charged
capsulas and walls of the box (including walls used in separation experi-
ments) also carry electric charges. Thus even “mechanically peaceful ap-
pearance” of a separating wall will induce (after a while) redistribudtion
of food in the sub-box.
Remark 6.3. (Fair sampling) At the moment we proceed under the
assumption of “fair sampling,” cf. [43], [44], [45]. Moving walls do not
kill statistically non-negligible populations of flyes.
To construct the QL-representation of the context C by a complex
probability amplitude, we need also probabilities:
pbC(β) = PC(Ωβ) ≡ P(Ωβ ∩ ΩC)
P(ΩC)
,
However, since we do not know the configuration C, we are not able to
apply Bayes’ formula directly. We should repeat previous considerations,
but by using now the horizontal wall which separates quickly the box into
top and bottom parts, Cβ1 and Cβ2 . Then by opening these sub-boxes
and counting flyes in each of them we find the probabilities pbC(β).
Of course, we should have two boxes with the same configuration C,
because each falling wall destroys this configuration. Thus we should be
able to make such a preparation a few times. Moreover, if one wants to
exclude effects of interaction between flyes (as one does in QM), there
12Two “Einstein demons” should be involved – one for each sub-box.
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should be created an ensemble of boxes, each box containing just one fly.
It is assumed that flyes would reproduce the food distribution.
In particular, for C = Cα, i.e., the configuration C which coinsides
with the α-part of the box we get: ΩCα = Ωα and
pbCα(β) = p
b|a(β|α).
However, we do not know from the very beginning that a hidden geometric
configuration is the half-box Cα. Therefore this is not an experimental way
to find transition probabilities.
To find transition probabilities, we assume that each half-box Cα can
be devided by the horyzontal wall (as in the original b-measurement in
the whole box) in two parts, say Cβ|α, β = β1, β2. By counting flyes in
each of these boxes we find the transition probabilities. At the moment we
proceed under the same assumptions as before: by puting the horyzontal
walls in the box Cα we do not change the distribution of food in it.
Now everything is prepared for application of QLRA. A nessesary con-
dition is given by R2), since in QM matrices of transition probabilities
are symmetrically conditioned. Thus from the very beginning one should
assume that the distribution of attracting sites in the box induces this
condition. This happens iff P(Ωα) = P(Ωβ) = 1/2.
The next condition is that variables are statistically conjugate, i.e.,
P(Ωα ∩ Ωβ) 6= 0 for all α and β.
Finally, the context C should be “large enough” with respect to both
variables: P(ΩC ∩Ωβ),P(ΩC ∩Ωα) > 0. Statistically small configurations
could not be represented in the QL-way (they are simply neglected in the
incomplete QL-representation of information).
We also know that, becides a complex probability amplitude, some
contexts can be represented by hyperbolic amplitudes, thus to guarantee
real QM-like representation we should have |λ| ≤ 1 for the coefficient of
interference.
Thus we represent all “trigonometric configurations” C by complex
vectors and the observables a and b by self-adjoint operators. The map:
Jb|a : Ctr → H
is a QL-analogue of the classical map J given by (10). Of course, the map
(10) is “better” than the QL-map. However, we are not able to use it in
the situation with invisible configuration C.
As was remarked, for some contexts, hyperbolic ones, |λ| > 1. They
are mapped into hyperbolic amplitudes:
Jb|a : Chyp → Hhyp,
whereHhyp is the hyperbolic analogue of Hilbert space [31]. Appearance of
such amplitudes is not surprising from the viewpoint of general contextual
probability theory. Why should the coefficient λ be always bounded by
one? It is surprising that we do not have them in conventional QM. In
some way it happens that all physical quantum contexts are trigonometric
(or that physical hyperbolic contexts have not yet beeen observed?).
Remark 6.4. (Complementarity or supplementarity?) We point out
that, although the “reference observables” a and b corresponding to two
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different separations of the box are represented by noncommutative oper-
ators, they can be considered as simutaneously existing: each fly has the
definite position in the box and hence its location in each part of the box
is well defined. This is the typical situation for the Kolmogorov approach:
the values of both random variables a(ω) and b(ω) are well defined for
each ω ∈ Ω. Thus “properties” a and b of a fly are not mutually exclusive,
in spite of noncommutativity: [aˆ, bˆ] 6= 0. Since Nils Bohr reserved the term
complementarity for mutually exclusive properties, it might be better to
call a and b supplementary observables, see [51]. It is clear that a result
of measurement of b produces supplementary information with respect to
the result of preceding measurement of a and vice versa.
7 How far can one proceed with the quantum-
like representation of the Kolmogorov model?
In spite of the presence of the underlyning Kolmogorov space, we con-
structed the QL-representation of probabilistic data for macroscopic con-
figurations (essentially incomplete representation) which has all distin-
guishing features of the conventional quantum representation of proba-
bilistic data for a pair of incompatible observables: intereference formula
for probabilities, Born’s rule, representation of these observables by self-
adjoint operators. As was mentioned, the map Jb|a is not injective. We
no ask: Is it surjective? Can one get any quantum state ψ and any pair
of quantum observables aˆ and bˆ in such a way? The answer is no. This
is a consequence of Bell’s type inequality for transition probabilities, see
[38] and appendix.
To apply conditional Bell’s inequality to our macroscoipic situation, it
is better to consider a ball bounded by the metal sphere, instead of the
box. We now can divide this ball into parts with the aid of central planes.
To simplify considerations, we can consider a boundle of planes which are
enumerated by the angle φ. Then we shall obtain a familty of observables
aφ, say taking values ±. Parts of the ball obtained by the φ-separation are
Cφ,+ = {θ : φ ≤ θ < φ+ π} and Cφ,− = {θ : φ+ π ≤ θ < φ}, respectively.
For each pair of them we find transition probabilities pφ1|φ2(ǫ1|ǫ2). For
each context C (a plastic packet with flyes inside it; this paket is placed
inside the metal ball; any attempt to open the ball would destroy this
paket) and any φ-section, we find probabilities pφC(ǫ), ǫ = ±. If we choose
a context C such that pφC(+1) = p
φ
C(−1) = 1/2 for all φ, then we can
apply arguments of appendix and we see that some types of transition
probabilities could not be obtained from a single Kolmogorov model.
One Kolmogorov space is too small to generate all quantum (or better
to say quantum-like) states and observables.
8 Disturbing measurements
However, we can easily modify our example to destroy the (hidden) Kol-
mogorov structure of the model. Suppose now that everything is as it
was before with only one difference: destruction of the packet by a wall
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(encoded by some φ-plane) induces not only the possibility for flyes to
move outside the packet, but also induces a redistribution of food sites,
cf. Remark 2. The latter is determined by the wall. Thus after e.g. the φ-
plane separation of the ball the distribution of sites with food in its parts
Cφ,+ and Cφ,− is not such as it was before this separation. Therefore, for
any successive φ′-separation of the sectors Cφ,ǫ (which were produced by
the previous φ-separation), the transition probabilities pφ
′|φ(ǫ′|ǫ) obtained
by an external observer do not coincide with the transition probabilities
which would be obtained by Einstein’s demon on the basis of the original
ensemble. Hence Bell’s type inequality for transition probabilities, see
appendix, cannot be applied.
In fact, by using random generators we can simulate probabilities for
any complex probability amplitude and any pair of self-adjoint operators
in the two dimensional Hilbert space.
For example, suppose that we would like to simulate the transition
probabilities for successive measurements of spin projections as well as the
uniform probability distribution for the aφ measurements for the original
context C (state ψC). To provide the latter condition, we start with the
uniform distribution of food. It would induce probabilities pφC(+1) =
pφC(−1) = 1/2.
Now to simplify considerations, we consider not three dimensional con-
figurations, but just two dimensional, in particular, we consider a circle,
instead of a ball, and sections by central lines, instead of planes.
We assume that disturbance induced by the aφ0 -measurement, 0 ≤
φ0 < π, induces redustribution of food in the sectors Cφ0,+ and Cφ0,−
and, finally, generates e.g. in the sector Cφ0,+ the density of flyes:
ρ+φ0(r, θ) = sin(θ − φ0). (11)
(We assume that the circle has unit radius). Then we separate the sector
Cφ0,+ by the φ-plane, say φ > φ0. Then the probability
pφ|φ0(+|+) =
Z 1
0
rdr
Z φ0+π
φ
sin(θ − φ0)dθ = cos2 φ− φ0
2
,
pφ|φ0(−|+) =
Z 1
0
rdr
Z φ
φ0
sin(θ − φ0)dθ = sin2 φ− φ0
2
.
For the sector Cφ0,−, we choose the probability distribution
ρ−φ0(r, θ) = − sin(θ − φ0). (12)
Here transition probabilities are given by
pφ|φ0(+|−) = −
Z 1
0
rdr
Z φ+π
φ0+π
sin(θ − φ0)dθ = sin2 φ− φ0
2
,
pφ|φ0(−|−) = −
Z 1
0
rdr
Z φ0+2π
φ+π
sin(θ − φ0)dθ = cos2 φ− φ0
2
.
Remark 8.1. (Complementarity or supplemntarity?) Since we con-
sider disturbing measurements, we (external observers) are not able to
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measure two observables, aφ1 and aφ2 , simultaneously. Thus these are in-
compatible observables. However, such measurement incompatibility does
not exclude that an element of reality can be assigned to each fly – the
pair aφ1(ω), aφ2(ω).We recall that we consider such separations that they
do not induce redistribution of flyes between sectors: the φ-plane moves so
quickly that flyes are not able to change sectors (or at least only statisti-
cally negligible number of flyes could make such changes). Moreover, only
negligible number of flyes can be killed by a moving-separating plane.
Thus the values of aφ1(ω) and aφ2(ω) which would be obtained by an
external observer coincide with the values which have been known by
Einstein’s demon before measurements. Therefore complementarity (in
the sense of mutual exclusivity) is only external observer’s complementar-
ity. Einstein’s demon still has supplementarity, in the sense of additional
information (of course, fuzzy) about fly’s location.
Remark 9.1. (Counterfactual arguments) We point out that already
in the previous remark we have applied counterfactual arguments – by
using “would be obtained by an external observer.” In fact, one cannot
escape them, because an external observer is not able to assign both values
aφ1(ω), aφ2(ω) to the same fly ω.
9 Can the classical probabilistic struc-
ture be violated without disturbance ef-
fects?
In section 7 we pointed out that by Bell’s inequality for transition prob-
abilities it is impossible to find a single underlying classical probabilis-
tic space which would reproduce all possible wave functions and pairs
of self-adjoint noncommutative operators in the contextual probabilistic
framework. One can not find such a Kolmogorov probability space that
by choosing different pairs of reference observables a, b and corresponding
families of trigonometric contexts Ctr(a, b) (represented by sets from the
σ-algebra of the Kolmogorov space) he would (by alpplying QLRA) cover
the whole unit sphere of Hilbert state space as well as obtain all pairs
of noncommutative self-adjoint operators. In section 8 we showed that
by considering disturbing measurements we can reproduce all quantum
structures. Can one approach the same result without disturbance? In
principle, yes!
9.1 Unfair sampling
One of possibilities is to proceed under unfair sampling assumption, see
Remark 6.3, cf. [43], [44], [45]. We can assume that moving planes sepa-
rating the metal ball do not produce food redistribution, thus the “food-
field” is not changed. However, these planes kill subensembles of flyes13,
13We remark that we really consider unfair samplig and not “the detectors efficiency.” We
operate with macroscopic systems – flyes which are are detected with probability one.
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depending on φ. Then we can easily violate the Bell’s inequality for con-
ditional probabilities.
9.2 Ensemble fluctuations
Another important point is that in section 7 we proceeded by using coun-
terfactual arguments, cf. remark 9.1. To be on really realistic ground, we
should consider at least three different balls and perform on them condi-
tional measurents for pairs of observables aφi , aφj . In principle, we cannot
guarantee that we would be able to reproduce statistically identical dis-
tributions of food in balls and idential hidden configurations. As was
emphasized in section 3, the map, see (6), from the collection of trigono-
metric contexts into complex probability amplitudes is not injection, var-
ious contexts can be mapped in the same complex probability amplitude.
Even if we are sure that we have the same QL-state given by the same
complex probability amplitude, ψ, we could never be sure that contexts in
different balls are the same. It may be that ψ = ψC1 = ψC2 = ... = ψCN
and moreover it may be that N →∞. Therefore we should work in multi-
Kolmogorovian framework and the Bell’s inequality for conditional prob-
abilities can also be violated without any disturbance.
This argument (but for composite systems) was presented at the first
time by De Baere [46], then by the author [40] and recently by Hess and
Philipp [48]. Moreover, they pointed out in [48] to the old paper of Soviet
mathematician Vorobjev [52] who studied the problem of the possibility
to realize a number of observables on a single Kolmogorv space. This
problem is equivalent to the problem of violation of Bell’s inequality for
transition probabilities.
9.3 Communication
In principle, we may also produce redistribution of flyes without redistri-
bution of the “food-field” if we assume that flyes can communicate. For ex-
ample, each separation measurement starts communication between flyes.
As the result, they can come to the agreement to concentrate in each sec-
tor Cφ0,± in such a way that e.g. sin-type dsitribution of section 8 would
be produced. If they communicate by using signals which we, external ob-
servers, are not able to detect, then this communication would be hidden
from us.
10 ERP-Bohm type experiments with flyes
We have considered in very detail measurements (in fact, position-type
measurements) for ensembles of single flyes. In principle, we could con-
sider the real EPR-Bohm type experiment for pairs of “entangled flyes”
which we put into different metal balls. One of technological problems is
to produce such pairs of flyes. However, this is not the main point. The
main point is that in the macroscopic framework such experiments would
not give so much more than experiments with single flyes. In contrast to
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photons or electrons, we have no doubts that flyes have objective prop-
erties, in particular, the position. Therefore the only consequence of the
EPR-Bohm type experiment with flyes would be that disturbing effects
should be excluded.14
Thus as well as in the case of a single system we have tree choices: a)
unfair sampling; b) ensemble fluctuations; c) nonrelativistic communica-
tions between flyes.
The last condition cannot be completely rejected even for human be-
ings, but the EPR-type experiment could not be used to provide the
crucial argument in its favor.
Conclusion. We shown that macroscopic configurations can be natu-
rally represented in the QL-way – by complex probability amplitudes – with
the aid of pairs of “supplementary observables” which in turn are repre-
sented by noncommutative self-adjoint operators. Classical probabilistic
structure can be violated. In particular, Bell’s type inequality can be vi-
olated. Such violations have nothing to do with “death of reality.” They
could be induced either by disturbing effects of measurements, or unfair
sampling, or ensemble fluctuations, or nonlocal communication between
macroscopic systems. The latter assumption is not so much reasonable
for macroscopic biological systems (however, it could not be completely
excluded).
11 Appendix: Bell’s inequality for tran-
sition probabilities
Theorem. Let a, b, c = ±1 be dichotomous uniformly distributed random
variables on a single Kolmogorov space. Then the following inequality
holds true:
P(a = +1|b = +1) +P(c = +1|b = −1) ≥ P(a = +1|c = +1) (13)
Proof. We have
P(b = +1) = P(b = −1) = P(a = +1) = P(a = −1) = P(c = +1) = P(c = −1) = 1/2.
Thus
P(a = +1|b = +1)+P(c = +1|b = −1) = 2P(a = +1, b = +1)+2P(c = +1, b = −1)
and
P(a = +1|c = +1) = 2P(a = +1, c = +1).
Hence by the well know Wiegner inequality [55] we get (13).
14We remind that we consider not only mechanical disturbance by moving planes, but also
the field type disturbance. To exclude the latter type of disturbance, one should be sure that
the effect of the “food-field” (e.g. smell) from one ball would be not able to propagate to
another ball. If balls have small windows (or produced not of metal, but of some less isolating
material), then smell can propagate from one ball to another. We recall that insects can find
smell-traces on huge distances. Thus to exclude completely disturbing effects, we should either
isolate balls completely or to make measurements on balls with a time-window such that a
signal from one ball would not be able to approach another during this time window, cf. [53]
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We underline again that the main distinguishing feature of (13) is the
presence of only transition probabilities. Transition probabilities can al-
ways be calculated by using quantum formalism for noncomposite systems.
In fact, we need not consider pairs of particles.
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